25 Years of Taiwan Relations Act--
Success and Challenge to the "One China " Policy

I-Chung Lai, Ph.D.
Director of Foreign Policy Studies
The Taiwan Thinktank

Introduction

“The question is how Beijing -- and the Bush administration -- will respond to Taiwan 's democratically expressed desire to find a new balance in its relations with China …Whatever the outcome of the island's Florida-style crisis, neither Mr. Chen nor the sentiment he represents are likely to disappear. It is in everyone's interest to seek a stabilization of relations across the Taiwan Strait: one that can be acceptable to Beijing while at the same time recognizing the yearning of a young democracy to be a "normal" nation .”

Taiwan's Message, Editorial from the Washington Post, March 23 rd , 2004.

     President Chen and Vice-President Annette Lu has been declared as the winner of the year 2004 presidential race by the central election commission on March 20 th , 2004, by a razor thin margin. Although the opposition party candidates, Drs. Lien Chan and James Soong have filed challenge for a recount, President Chen is now certified as the person to be inaugurated on May 20 th unless the court has decided otherwise then. Besides giving President Chen the winning margin, these 29518 votes also carry very important political impacts on the regional environment in the East Asia region.

     There are several significant developments occurred in this presidential election. First, Chen Shui-Bian and Annette Lu won the election by obtaining absolute majority. If we compare the result of this election and the year 2000 election, we would find out that Chen and Lu has obtained 1.5 million more votes than they got four years ago. There is an evenly distributed increase by 10-15% across the island. To many political observers, this phenomenon illustrates that the Taiwanese Identity, the political value/ideology embodied by Chen and Lu, is in the mainstream now.

     Second, there was a referendum jointly held with the presidential election and both of the topics are defeated due to the people participating in the referendum did not cross the required minimum of 50% of all eligible voters. Despite the defeat, there are still around 60% of the presidential election voters participated the referendum; much more than President Chen's 50.1% majority. Knowing there was an active boycott campaign against this referendum by Lien Chan and James Soong, and the extremely high threshold for validation of the referendum, the passage for this referendum was evidently very difficult. Despite this failing attempt, the psychological barrier for enacting referendum has been surpassed. We probably will witness that the referendum will become an integral part of Taiwan 's political culture from now on.

     Third, the political and social fiasco after the election revealed how fragile Taiwan democracy is. The rule of the law has been consistently ignored by the politicians who seek to overturn the outcome through extraordinary means. The self-regulatory mechanism designed to deal with the democratic disputes has been bypassed in favor of foreign intervention. The last fifteen years of cultivating Taiwan 's image as the crown Jewry of Asia 's democracy has been tarnished in seven days. Not only is society divided, the confidence of the democracy is badly shaken.

     Those three developments all have important implications to Taiwan 's external relations. The victory of Chen and Lu immediately puts the sustainability of the “One China” policy into question. The integration of referendum into Taiwan 's normal political practice will require careful and prudent political management to avoid misunderstanding which could lead to catastrophe. The tarnishing of Taiwan 's image as the treasure of Asia's democratic transition is extremely damaging to Taiwan since Taiwan desperately needs the moral high ground, as evidenced by the peaceful establishment of democracy, to obtain support from the international society for its global engagement. Taiwan is having an urging task to save its international image as for now.

1. Impact to the “One China ” Policy

     Those results will cast significant impacts to the “One China Policy” which has existed for more than thirty years since the announcement of the “Shanghai Communiqué” in 1972. There are three important elements constituting the “One China” policy, namely, the U.S.-China strategic cooperation, the unchallenged Chinese identity, and the unification of Taiwan and China as the announced political norm then.

The Changing Strategic Context

     The U.S.-Soviet Union-China triangular relation has changed fundamentally in 1972 due to the U.S.-China rapprochement. The Shanghai Communiqué is considered as the concrete result of the realization of the U.S.-China rapprochement. The United States and China are facing the common enemy of the Soviet Union . The only dividing issue is Taiwan . The Shanghai Communiqué is a cleverly worded document to prevent Taiwan issue from hindering the bigger goal of the U.S.-China strategic cooperation. Thus we can argue, the existence of a common threat, the Soviet Union, provides the pretext for both sides not to be dragged on by their differences in Taiwan .

     The whole scenario changed after the Cold War ended in 1991. Since the Soviet Union collapsed, so is the existence of the ground for the U.S.-China strategic cooperation. The United States and China now need to deal with each other on their own merit. Thus many issues previously been submerged are now surfacing to the forefront. Taiwan issue is one of those issues. It is the change of strategic environment due to the end of the Cold War that has changed the strategic calculations about Taiwan issue.

Change of Identity and Perception of Taiwan 's Future Trajectory

     The democratization of Taiwan , mostly progressed in the post-Cold War period, also changed two other elements of the “One China” policy. A close review of the following sentences, which constitute as the core of the “One China” policy will give us the key. These sentences are: “ The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. ”

     The first one comes to mind is the usage of Chinese to describe the identity of the people on Taiwan . I believe the democratization process in the last 15 years has fundamentally changed this identity assumption for the people in Taiwan . According to the opinion poll conducted by the United Daily about the personal identity distribution of the people in Taiwan in the last ten years, it witnessed the steady decline of Chinese identity, from about 50% down to 10-15%, and the increase of the Taiwanese identity, from about 15% up to close to 50%, with the number of dual identity (people who identified themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese) remains relatively the same in the same time span. The phenomenon of changing identity, according to many sociologists, is the direct result of the democratization process at the same time.

     The second issue is whether the ROC government agreed with the position that Taiwan is a part of China . In 1972 when Taiwan was still under Chiang Kai-Shek regime, the goal for Taiwan-China unification has never been questioned. The major difference between Taipei and Beijing was about who represented China in the world. This assertion has been gradually eroding in the 90' s, unification with China starts to attract less and less people in Taiwan as the future for Taiwan . Though people are still hesitant about declaring independence, but the support for unification is apparently losing steam. The Chen and Lu's victory in year 2004 seems to further marginalize the unification option in Taiwan . The mainstream view is to preserve the status quo, to remain separate from China as long as possible, while not to provoke China by declaring Taiwan Independence.

     Thus, it seems that the norm of both the personal identity and the future of Taiwan have been fundamentally changed with the deepening of democratization in the 90' s, and the two premises presiding the core of the “One China” policy spelled out in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué are now no longer valid. We are facing a new reality in Taiwan in the 21 st century.

     If we check the diplomatic records, it seems that the United States has already predicted this outcome when they were preparing the wording for the Shanghai Communiqué. According to Marshall Green's memoir, it is his insistence to put “all Chinese people” instead of “all people” in that key sentence. The reason was: “…the inhabitants of Taiwan who looked upon the island as their home regardless of the point of origin in China of their ancestors, and regarded themselves as “Taiwanese”, would not necessarily agree that Taiwan was part of China .” Their voices were suppressed by the Chiang Kai-shek's regime, which was considered as dictatorial and there were questions regarding its legitimacy. From the above mentioned Marshall Green's recollection, we probably can argue that one of the key factor for holding these two premises (predominant Chinese identity and Taiwan is a part of China ) is the dictatorial practice of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Due to the suppression of the dissenting voice, there was a lack of social challenge to both of these norms. When Taiwan started to engage democratization in the 90' s, it is natural that both premises would soon be marginalized.

     Since the “One China” policy's three key elements; the U.S.-China strategic cooperation, the prevailing Chinese identity in Taiwan and the unchallenged goal for Taiwan-Mainland China unification, are either vanished or politically marginalized, it is more and more difficult to sustain the “One China” policy. The emerging concern about the “unpredictable outcome of Taiwanese Democracy” would draw the United States into an unwanted conflict with China , testifies the severity of the how unsustainable the current “One China” framework is. It is not exaggerating to say, if no adjustments have been made, that the “One China” policy is in a collision course with the progression of Taiwanese democracy.

“ Taiwan Relations Act” and “One China ” Policy

     Ironically, the “One China” policy has created its own gravedigger in Taiwan democracy. The current Bush administration stated that its own “One China” policy is composed of the three U.S.-China communiqués and the “Taiwan Relations Act”. The Taiwan Relations Act has explicitly stated that “…The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States ”. During the debate related with the process of drafting the Taiwan Relations Act, many members of the Congress had expressed the concern about the lack of democracy and political liberty on Taiwan . Some have urged the U.S. Congress to take the active role to advocate “majority rule based on respect for individual rights”, while some other senior members urged the then newly established American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) to promote political liberties in Taiwan . I do not think it is an overstatement that the Taiwan Relations Act has been an integral part of promoting and enhancing Taiwanese democracy during the past 25 years after witnessing the amazing distance Taiwan has traveled in the last quarter century.

     Now we are in a very funny situation, one criterion in identifying the achievement of the “One China” policy in the last thirty years is how it has successfully helped the transformation of Taiwan into one of a politically democratic and economically prosperous society. And the very success it breeds has turned against itself. This is the dilemma in need of answers day by day.

Prerequisite of the new U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

     To solve (or manage) this problem, probably we need to see what we are facing now to figure the available tools.

     First, the Chinese power is getting larger everyday. It is a country accomplishing much with even larger potential untapped, but its future is uncertain.

     Second, since Taiwanese democracy will only grow and can not be constrained, Taiwanese identity will only get stronger as time goes by, although there are close economic engagements happening across the Taiwan Strait .

     Third, due to the absence of greater threat to be provided as the common enemy for enacting the U.S.-China strategic cooperation, the U.S. and China will have areas where their interests are in conflict and areas where their interests converge. This means the U.S. and China will need to deal with each other on their own merit. Regarding Taiwan , the United States has major interest in maintaining the stability across the Taiwan Strait and can not allow a democratic Taiwan to be coerced to surrender by the military threat from a dictatorship regime. Failing to prevent such scenario, the whole credibility and the security commitment of the United States in the Asia-Pacific will be put into questions. The United States does not want to be dragged into unwanted conflict for obvious reasons.

     All of these factors are essential parts of the inputs for the equation of the U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. We do need to live with China and to prepare an environment conducive for its positive development. But this does not mean it should be done at the expense of Taiwan 's democracy. It is more appropriate to treat Taiwan democracy as part of the solution, rather than as part of the problems. Taiwan democracy can not be solved or constrained, and it will not go away.

     What does this imply to the “One China” policy? I believe we are facing the situation that it is not whether “One China” policy will last, but how long will it last. How much of the damage of sustaining the current “One China” policy framework will do to the U.S.-Asia relations in general and U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral relations in particular? Is there any available alternative at hand?

Taking the New Strategic Challenge in Asia

     Though there seems to be no feasible alternative at hand, but any new solutions, in addition to be accepted by both Beijing and Taipei , have to be a part of a larger policy framework that reflects the new geo-strategic challenges we are facing in Asia today.

     In the East Asia , we see four trends of national developments occurring at the same time. Besides the democratization process in Taiwan and the growing importance of China as the regional power, Japan and South Korea are also experiencing tremendous changes. The Japan is in the process of “normalization” by its willingness to match its political role with its economic power. This development will lead to a more intensive Japan-China strategic competition in this region.

     The political situation is also changing fast in the Korean Peninsula . How sustainable the North Korea is remains an open question. The coming to fore of the post-Korean War generation, the economic success and the democratization altogether, has changed the ROK's overall strategic and security perception. We start to witness there is a wider gap in terms of the recognition of national interest between Seoul and Washington . The diverging interests in ROK and the United States have complicated Washington 's management of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. I believe it will be a whole different scenario if Washington and Seoul are more in sync in this issue..

     The Southeast Asia is now plagued by the political and social instability after many of its economies were dealt severe blow in the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998. This social environment provides the fertile ground to breed the terrorism activities in this area. The emerging of India also brings in a whole new strategic outlook for the Southeast Asia and the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.

     That is, despite that Taiwan Strait, along with the unpredictable North Korea , remains the two most explosive hot spot for military conflict, there are other new sources of frictions due to the changing strategic trends associated with internal social and political developments in each country. Any new policy framework should be equipped to deal with this new situation, or at least to allow room for adjustments to meet the new challenges.

2. Referendum as Part of Taiwan 's Political Practices

     The first ever referendum practice has been defeated on March 20 th . Many observers take very doubtful eyes regarding the impurity of the motive. They are also relieved when they learn the result that both of them have been defeated. But this does not mean the problem will go away since the legitimacy of referendum has already been established. And we always should not forget that the votes participating in the referendum is one million more than the votes for President Chen, so the social support for referendum practice is very substantial. It is very possible from now on we will witness referendum to be regularly held in conjunction with elections. Thus the referendum will be part of Taiwan 's political practices.

     China has expressed its opposition to any referendum for fear of the enactment of referendum will pave the way for declaring Taiwan Independence. U.S. is concerned about the Chinese reaction to Taiwan 's referendum, fearing if this action-chain will draw the United States into war with China over Taiwan . Since referendum has enjoyed broad social support in Taiwan , this political practice will repeat no matter who the elected leader of Taiwan is. It is better to find a way to accommodate this political practice than try to prevent it from happening. Taipei and Washington both need to learn from this March 20 th lessons.

     For Taipei , the domestic political environment and its impact to decisions are in need of better explanations. There were not many convincing arguments provided to explain why Taipei believed the enactment of referendum was crucial. Taipei-Washington communications, in terms of both frequency and contents, need vast improvements. For Washington , it is important not to view Taiwan 's political initiative purely through cross-Strait angle. Taiwan democracy has its own life and momentum. Active engaging with Taiwanese democracy will also gives you the means to healthily influence the outcome to prevent disaster.

3. Post-Election Fiasco and its Implication to Taiwan 's External Relations

     The post-election fiasco highlights the fragility of Taiwanese democracy. Whether this phenomenon will lead to the loss of confidence of international community on Taiwan 's democracy, or Taiwan 's commitment to the rule of the law, remains to be seen. We can not deny that Taiwan is no longer looked upon as the Crown Jewry of Asia's democracy. Taiwan 's image as the success story of democracy has been dampened. Those are serious blow to Taiwan 's international image.

     Strategically speaking, will this loss of moral high ground lead to withdrawing of the U.S. support for Taiwan 's security? Probably not. However, due to the lack of personal understanding at high level between Taipei and Washington , the continuation of current problems could lead to the strategic marginalization of Taiwan and its further diplomatic isolation, as we have witnessed in the Republic of Korea . Unless Taiwan is able to put its house in order, especially to consolidate the already weakening democracy, Taiwan will not be able to take any meaningful foreign policy initiative. This problem goes to the very core of the political and social foundation of Taiwan .

Conclusions

     We are in need of a new framework one that will address the Beijing 's need for external stability and can accommodate the yearning of Taiwanese democracy. Having no feasible alternative at hand should not deter people from trying for new proposals. We need a framework to deal with the problems we are about to face tomorrow, then to preserve the legacy of yesterday. The new strategic reality of the Asia-Pacific in the 21 st century will set the perimeter to craft a coherent policy framework which also will address the new U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral dynamics.

We are also facing the challenge to need to accommodate the constant practices of referendum in Taiwan . Both Washington and Taipei will have to be extremely careful in management. Taiwan is also now fighting the uphill battle to patch the broken image as the model democracy in Asia after the post-election fiasco. Those are serious challenges but they are not insurmountable obstacles. There are reasons to be optimistic.

Quote from The Shanghai Communiqué.

Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, William N. Stokes, “War and Peace with China ”, pp.145-146, DACOR Press, Bethesda , Maryland , U.S.A. , 1994

Marshall Green, Ibid.

Quote from “ Taiwan Relations Act”, Section 2 (c)

Stephen J. Yates, “The Taiwan Relations Act after 20 years: Keys to past and Future Success”, the Backgrounder No. 1272, The Heritage Foundation, April, 16 th , 1999.

Robert Sutter, “Bush's Korea Policy Gravitates Toward China, Will Taiwan Policy Follow?”, PacNet #13, April 1 st , 2004, the Pacific Forum, CSIS.

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