1992 Consensus and Its Contextual Connotations　

Jiann-fa Yan
Director of Chinese Affairs, the DPP

　　Chen Shui-bian's government has been trying very hard to send positive messages to Beijing. In his presidential inauguration speech on May 20th, President Chen announced that he would not declare independence, not change the name of nation, not push forth 'state-to-state' theory into the Constitution, not hold a referendum to change the status quo, and not abolish the Guidelines for National Unification and the National Unification Council, as long as China had no intention to use military force against Taiwan.

　　But till now, Beijing has never ceased its criticism towards Chen's policy, though Beijing's authority, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen, utters a softer tone. Beijing's leaders criticize that Chen Shui-bian lacks sincerity and intends to be evasive and unclear over 'One China' principle. While accusing Taiwanese authorities of tending towards separatism, Beijing appeals to Taipei to return to 1992 consensus, which is unilaterally asserted by Beijing to be based upon 'One China' principle. Taking One China as the core of cross-strait consensus, Beijing attacks Taiwan's independence advocates on the one hand and pretends a peacemaker on the other hand. 

　　In response to Beijing's tactics, Chen makes a soft and low profile gesture. Skillfully, he calls upon Beijing to jointly deal with the question over 'a future One China.' In Chen's mind, most importantly, this appeal will not provoke China and be in accordance with 'peaceful resolution' strategy which has been regarded as a precondition for the US response to the cross-strait issues. Indeed, Chen's tactics make Beijing find no serious flaws to attack Taiwan by force. But Beijing has asserted that Chen's concession is lack of sincerity and just for tactical purposes. From this angle, it is predictable that Beijing will continue pressing and isolating Chen's government till the last end.

　　In the Clinton-Jiang summit of the United Nations held in September in New York, Jiang Zemin reiterated the Chinese brotherhood across the Taiwan Strait. He also insisted on peaceful unification and 'one system, two countries.' He tried to expel the US by maintaining the principle of no interference of domestic affairs by claiming "sovereignty is indivisible, and Taiwan is part of China". Meanwhile, Jiang stressed again that Taiwan was the most sensitive part of Sino-US relations. It is very obvious that Jiang is trying to convert Taiwan issue into a domestic one, and urges the US not to interfere into the cross-strait issues. But Beijing's move is so unrealistic since the US has so huge economic and political interests in the Taiwan Strait. 

2. Controversies on 1992 consensus

　　However, a question remains unsolved: how do both sides deal with the so-called 񟬸 consensus?' Obviously, there is no easy answer unless both sides of the Strait ambiguously interpret the Consensus. Meanwhile, the US has to help create a favorable environment and facilitate the resumption of cross-strait dialogue.

　　The citizens in Taiwan will definitely disagree with PRC's definition on "One China". During past decades, most Taiwan residents have recognized themselves as ROC citizens. In its Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Destiny, the DPP（the Democratic Progressive Party） advocates that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state; so, there is no need to claim independence any more; and the DPP recognizes the ROC as the nation's name. Therefore, the ROC regime is autonomous enough to claim being an independent sovereign state. Furthermore, through democratization, the ROC has been a meaningful symbol substantiated by Taiwanese contents without any relevance with the Mainland. Through substantial democratization, the ROC entity has been reborn as a new republic with Taiwanese contents. Hence, in this sense, Beijing's 'one country, two systems' formula is an unrealistic fiction for Taiwan. 

　　Nevertheless, in the international community, Taiwan's voice on recognition is intentionally neglected since Taiwan stays in a world with 'One China' concept. The US and Japan want to see the current international system maintained since it fits the great powers' best interest. In Taipei's views, Taiwan cannot accept 'One China' principle, otherwise the US and Japan will naturally lose legitimate grounds to intervene into Taiwan's affairs. The international intervention in the cross-strait affairs may secure Taiwan to some extent. Furthermore, only competing with China's monopoly over the definition of 'One China' will Taiwan find a way out of Chinese political dominance. Hence, the ROC entity becomes the bottom line for Taipei to negotiate with Beijing towards jointly dealing with 'a future One China' issue.
 
　　For China, Beijing still insists on 'One China' principle. Politically, there seems no room for both sides to resume talks. On September 16, President Chen asserted lifting bans on three links; but Beijing did not clearly respond to it. In Beijing's speculation, Taiwan tends to be economically dependent on China and politically self-constrained by Chen's Ƌ Nos' stated in his inauguration speech. Taiwan has gradually lost its bargain chips. Beijing estimates the time is on China's side.  Beijing feels no rush in dealing with economic exchanges, especially three links. China becomes strong and hard maintaining, "as soon as President Chen accepts the 'One China' principle, links can go ahead." Nevertheless, it is doubtful that 'One China' principle is just used as an excuse to blur the issue itself. The very reason for Beijing to pay less interest in direct links at this moment may be for protecting the stagnant Hong Kong and Macao from losing their privileged status as entrepots between Taiwan and China. 

3. The entrance of the WTO will bring about new scenarios

　　For the time being, due to reasons stated above, cross-strait relations seem doomed to fall into stalemate. Both sides are unlikely to resume dialogue soon. Nevertheless, for practical interests, both sides' entrance of the WTO may provide a chance for themselves to resume talks over trade and related practical issues. 

　　Beijing had ever striven to stick 'One China' principle on Taiwan's WTO membership, but President Clinton rejected it. After both sides enter into the WTO, new scenarios will follow. Under the WTO framework, a wide range of markets from agriculture to telecommunications will be opened to both sides. People must face the reality that if agreements cannot be reached, there will be no regular business transactions. Therefore, both sides urgently need the resumption of talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait. 

　　Since the consensus of 'One China' principle cannot be reached fully, the WTO occasion is supposed to provide a new opportunity for both sides to sit and talk without touching sovereignty issue. Politics and economy can be discussed separately under the WTO framework. 

　　However, China's influence on Taiwan will increase while cross-strait economic exchanges are enhanced. For the purpose of division of labor, the entrance of the WTO will speed the pace of economic integration among the US, Japan, Taiwan and China. Also, Taiwan will be greatly involved in the triangular web. Taiwan may assume a positive role to bridge US, Japan and China, if Taiwan can actively engage into Chinese market. On the contrary, the cross-strait issue may be an ammunition depot if the tension is not properly lessened. The cross-strait issue will become much more sensitive while the triangular relationship among the US, Japan, China, and Taiwan will be more tangled. 

　　Due to Beijing's obstinacy over sovereignty issue, it is natural that Taiwan will look to the US for more support. It is worth noting that Chinese spokesman of foreign ministry Zu Bun Zhao recently commentates Clinton's disappointment at Chen Sui-bian's backward-moving utterance over cross-strait issue at a press conference in the UN. But, the White House clarifies it immediately in the next day. The events have shown that Beijing was trying to block Taiwan by manipulating international occasions, but the US has no willing to dance with Chinese tango.

　　On July 13, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen uttered a soft tone that 'One China' is only a principle and a foundation without referring any details, such as the format under which unification is to be achieved. Putting aside Beijing's resentment towards DPP's independence, it seems that there exists a slight beam of possibilities for both sides to reduce differences, especially after the DPP recognized the ROC as the official name of its nation in May 1999. In a sense, the PRC and the ROC may reach a convergence towards jointly dealing with 'a future One China.' 

4. The cross-party task force may play an active role

　　Beside the external factors mentioned above, on behalf of Taiwan's overall civilian opinions and interests, a task force headed by the President of Academia Sinica Lee Yuan-tseh, serving as President Chen's advisory board may play a new role to bridge the clash between Taipei and Beijing. As an advisory board to the president, the cross-party task force on the cross-strait relations is regarded as a trusted body by President Chen to balance the National Unification Council. 

　　In his speech, Mr. Lee maintains that both sides may go back to the 1992 consensus as orally express One China principle respectively. He also identifies Taiwanese with Chinese in the speech. Basically, Lee's tone is more approaching the fringe of ' One China' connotation. It can possibly pursue the KMT（the Kuo-Ming Party） and the PFP（the People First Party） to accept it; meanwhile, it shows a good-will response to Beijing's demand on 'One China' Principle. Beijing used to fiercely criticize Mr. Lee for his supporting Chen during the presidential election. But it seems turning to a soft tone in evaluating Lee after he makes that speech. Certainly, there are some difficulties ahead to overcome for Lee in consolidating domestic consensus while taking Beijing's interests into consideration.

　　However, it is very realistic that a divided Taiwan will lose power to compete with China. Under this consideration, Lee's speech calling for Beijing's cooperation is meaningful and significant. For strategic concerns, the aims of a softer approach for Taiwan's cross-strait policy are: peaceful voices may earn more sympathy from the international society; shorter distance between China and Taiwan may lessen the risks from China's attack; and consistency among different parties in Taiwan can strengthen Taiwan's bargain power.