What to Learn from EU Integration:
Some Points on Cross-Strait Development　

Prof. Yachung Chang
Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies,
Nanhua University, R.O.C.

European integration saw its outset in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The success of the ECSC led the six member states to form the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom) six years later. The three communities were then merged, effective 1967. The year 1978 saw the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS), and 1987 the passing of Single European Act (SEA). Europe started to promote the Economic and Monetary Union in 1989. Major steps were further achieved when the Treaty of Masstricht was passed in 1991 and the European Union (EU) was established in 1993. The EU expanded to include 15 member states in 1995 and the year 1999 marked the formal issuing of the Euro. The development signifies that Europe has succeeded in transcending the thinking based on the interests of the national state through the long process of its integration. It not only helps maintain peace in Europe, but bolster the prosperity of Europe. The EU’s experience serves as an inspiring model for Taiwan and Mainland China, who have long been trapped in the conflicts of sovereignty.　

l. What  EU’s integration tells for a possible shift in thinking

To my view, the EU’s integration experience provides alternative thinking in dealing with cross-Strait conflicts in at least seven aspects as follows:　

Europe adopts a strategy of constructing mutual sense of community in tackling with security and development issues. The main point here is that traditional mode of cooperation between states is not enough to lift mistrust. Only a pluralistic security community promises a viable way to uproot wars. European countries, however, decline to end the status of state in too hasty a pace. They only hand part of state power over to the transnational organization. The rest would still depend largely on inter-governmental cooperation. The integration mode is not like the mechanical one of  “one country, two systems” that is advocated by the People’s Republic of China. It differs also from Taiwan’s proposition of “Guidelines for National Unification,” which is in nature functional integration. The EU’s integration stands somewhere at the mid-point and can moderate the propositions on both sides of the Strait.　

Sovereignty does not mount to be an obstacle to the integration of European countries. First World War experience provides an inspiring lesson: for them, the suppression of Germany did not solve the problem at issue but led instead to the outburst of another world war. In view of this, EU founding members were willing to include West Germany in the forming community, even before it was able to achieve a full national sovereignty. The open-mindedness and insight shown by the EU founding members in allowing a West Germany with no full sovereignty to share the rights they enjoy should provide a precious lessen for both sides of the Strait, especially Mainland China.　

In West Germany’s case, it never emphasized the importance of sovereignty in seeking to break its political predicament.  It adopted a low-key tactic, which stressed cooperation instead of putting forward the issue of sovereignty. If West Germany had made the acquisition of full sovereignty a prerequisite to cooperation, the move would have aroused mistrust among other European countries. West Germany’s experience tells that a less-privileged country should smartly take into account the reality of international politics and its own manageable power in fighting its way for full sovereignty. Sovereignty is harder to achieve by adopting an oppositional stance than by a process of cooperation. West Germany succeeded to achieve its full sovereignty through its cooperative move in European integration. And, more than that, it has succeeded in gaining a significant presence in the EU. If Taiwan acts likewise, it promise to set off in a natural course its earnestly quested sovereignty through the formation of a community across the Strait.　

European integration is a great and creative move in the human history. Its value lies in that it on the one hand builds a transnational organization and stresses on the other inter-governmental cooperation. The spirit is inspiring for the solution to cross-Strait conflicts. As for the technical problem of what kind of affairs should go to transnational organizations and what else to inter-governmental cooperation, the answer differs between the EU’s case and two sides of the Strait. A first move to introduce some transnational operations between Taiwan and Mainland China, however, is essential in order to cultivate a mutual sense of community.　

Geopolitics remains an indispensable concept in today’s international political economy. Even for country like the Great Britain that believes in the doctrine of economic liberalism, to enter a bloc economy shaping in the continental Europe is a path they cannot dodge. If Taiwan does not relate itself to any bloc economy in its competition in global market economy, it will have little say in future development of world trade and economy, the rule of which is obviously determined by political and economic powers. Hence, to achieve an economic integration with Mainland China is crucial and beneficial to Taiwan’s future development.　

To have a say means to participate first. The Great Britain gained its legal say in the development and agenda of European integration only after it joined the European Community in the 1970’s. If Taiwan and Mainland China establish a kind of integration, Taiwan will naturally gain a say in cross-Strait affairs in the process of blueprinting related policies and issues. To stop the rise of antagonism through the work of integration is an option much more effective compared with an oppositional strategy. The geopolitical closeness of Taiwan to the Mainland results an indivisibility on the part of Taiwan in the economic and trade relations across the Strait. If Taiwan wants a development of cross-Strait relations more toward the direction it wishes, then institutionalizing cross-Strait integration is an issue Taiwan has to seriously give thoughts to.　

If taking part in a regional integration is necessary, and then the suggestion is the sooner the better. An early participation ensures a satisfactory presence as well as influence. Roy Jenkins, a British Labor Party leader and former chairmen of EC Commission, pointed out that a miscalculation on the part of the British government made the country absent in the early days of EC formulation, and also lose its favorable chance to decide on the role and function of the EC. The Great Britain has been at issues with other EC member states over a wide range of topics such as budgets ever since it took part. This is largely due to its absence in the EC’s early stage of formation. If Taiwan recognizes its geopolitical reality, or agrees that cross-Strait integration is an inevitable trend, then an earlier move to bolster integration with Mainland China will help dissolve mutual hostility sooner, and in the end benefit its own development.

ll. What EU experience tells for the issue of international status:

Legal personality of community: 

International law is an ever-evolving legal system. In traditional international law, only state is entitled to be a subject of international law. Contemporary development, however, revises the view. Albeit state remains a major subject of international law, it is not any more the only subject. International organizations and individuals are also recognized as eligible subjects of international law. A prominent instance of this is the EC’s presence on the international stage as an international person. In other words, within the EU there are actually 16 international persons, including the 15 represented by its member states and the EU itself. What is revealing from EU experience is that Taiwan and Mainland China can create a third legal subject, that is cross-Strait community, other than those represented by the two sides in their future participation in international affairs.

Scholars define the subject of international law as an international legal person who possesses legal personality. And in international law, one that possesses all the international rights and duties are considered to own full international personality. Those only entitled to partial rights and duties are said to have limited international personality. For the present time, state remains the only international legal person enjoying full international personality.　

The EU is entitled to be an international person thanks to its founding treaty. Article 210 of the EC Treaty stipulates, “The Community shall have legal personality.” Article 211 further stipulates that “in each of the Member States, the Community shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under the laws, it may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and may be a party to legal proceedings. To this end, the Community shall be represented by the Commission.” Article 183 and 184 of the Euratom Treaty have regulations in identical terms with the above two articles of the EC.　

The EC was entitled to be an international legal person under the agreement of member states and enjoyed high international legal personality. The treaty also mandates its member states to hand part of its sovereignty over to the EC in order to enable the latter to effectively operate on the international stage.　

The EC’s presence as an international legal person was to be recognized by the international society. From the political aspect, the first problem arising was if its legal personality was recognized or not by other nations outside the EC or by other international organizations. In the cold war period, the EC’s status in international organizations set off political wrestling between the West and East blocs. For instance, the EC had seen a suspending resolution for its status as an observer in the UN until 1974 when the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) of the Socialist bloc was also entitled to the rights. Now an absolute majority of world nations have recognized the EC’s legal person status. In the legal aspect, however, a majority of world organizations still stipulate that its membership is only open to sovereignty state. This means that the EU has to boost revisions to related regulations in order to join these international organizations. Furthermore, although the EC enjoys extensive foreign relations by taking part in international organizations, it has never replaced the subject positions represented by its member states. Other members of these international organizations would cast their doubts and worries over the EC being accepted as a formal member, as it would lead to a possible imbalance in future voting concerning representative rights and other issues. In view of this, the EC shows quite a self-restraint and is not pushing too hard to win a full membership in international organizations. It instead strives for more rights to participate in the activities of related international organizations.

The EC has set up observation delegations and become an observer in some major international organizations. For instance, the EC has become an observer to the UN assembly since 1984. It has been accepted as an observer to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) since 1971. It has also obtained the observer status from the ECOSOC’s Regional Commission and Functional Commission. The list of international organizations the EC has enjoyed presence has been extended to include the Specialized Agencies of the UN, International Labor Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Educational Scientific and Culture Organization, (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Civil Aviation Organization (IVAO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), International Telecommunications Union (ITU), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Tourism Organization (TWO). As for regional organizations, the EU has set up permanent observer delegation in the Council of Europe, European Conference of Ministers of Transport, Central Commission for the Navigation on the Rhine, European Civil Aviation Conference, Organization of American States, Western European Union (WEU), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OSCE).[1]　

One other thing worth mentioning is that in the GATT times, the EC, like other GATT members, took part in the activities of GATT organizations, except those of the budget commission. It even exerted rights and performed duties as an independent legal person. The EC was able to negotiate with other GATT members in multi-lateral trade talks since the early 1960’s. Although the EC is not a formal member of the GATT, it was able to take part in policy decision in most cases. A look into the GATT’s sub-agreements concerning trade with Europe would find that they were mostly and in many cases solely signed by the EU. In procedures to solve trade conflicts, the EC not only participated, but was also recognized as a party of the conflicts, although many conflicts actually resulted from the domestic measures of its individual member states. To sum up, the EC enjoyed a special presence in the GATT. It was not a formal member, but it in real practice gradually took over some functions of its member states. To put it in simpler words, in both the GATT and subsequent WTO, the EC achieves its international status as a member state, instead of an observer.　

2. What Taiwan and Mainland China can draw from EC experience:

The biggest predicament existing in current cross-Strait relations is the issue of representative status in international organizations. Although the PRC agrees that Taiwan and the Mainland are both a part of China, it maintains that the PRC government is the only legal representative of China for international relations. Taiwan’s moves to win international status are always construed as seeking Taiwan independence. The discrepancies the two sides show in the issue of representative status have blocked a mutual trust in the Strait. Multiple representative statuses as displayed by the instance of the EC and its member states should be worth a deeper look by both sides of the Strait.

First of all, the two sides should tune their thinking to the concept that “three subjects across the Strait”: one is the Republic of China, another is the People’s Republic of China and the other is "China as a whole/ Whole China". Taiwan is a part of Whole China, so is Mainland China. The third subject of Whole China can have its presence in the international society as “Cross-Strait Community.”

The EC experience would be revealing in relation to the question as how to substantiate the operation of the third subject in the Strait. The EC operates in the international society as “EC countries as a whole.” Its existence did not jeopardize the subject positions of its member states. Likewise, in international organizations, the two sides of the Strait can organize a third party representing Whole China (named Cross-Strait Community), in addition to their respective representative seats. The representative of Cross-Strait Community can then take part in WHO, ILO, UN and WTO as an observer.  Meanwhile, Taiwan and Mainland China would contribute to these organizations according to their respective capacity, as well as based on the principle of “equal but unsymmetrical.” In the beginning, the “third subject” that represents “Whole China” may have limited functions, mainly for coordination and association. With the deepening of cross-Strait integration, however, the “third subject” will be able to take over more and more functions of the two other subjects. Just like the case with the EC, this “third subject” would see a rising power, which in turn indicates that the two sides are proceeding toward the path of unification.　

Modeling after the EC’s experience, the subject of  “Whole China” can in practice appear in the international society as an incomplete legal person. The two sides then agree to bestow the “Cross-Strait Community” that represents “Whole China” a status of legal person. In the early period, the “Cross-Strait Community” may not own the full rights enjoyed by the two other subjects, and for which the two sides are to negotiate and reach consensus. The joint presence of Cross-Strait Community” with Taiwan and Mainland China in international organizations signifies that there are three coexistent legal subjects. Among them, Taiwan and Mainland China are both full legal persons, while the “Cross-Strait Community” is not. In international organizations, Taiwan and Mainland will take part as formal members, while the  “Cross-Strait Community” as an observer. This mode could be adopted in the operations of international organizations such as WHO, ILO, etc.　

The insistence that only two subjects exist across the Strait has mired the two sides in a kind of zero-sum struggle since 1949. The more Mainland China shows its determination not to make concession on the issue, the greater appeal is for Taiwan in pursuing for an “independent Taiwan” or “Taiwan independence.” If the two sides follow the model provided by European integration,  it would help clear the doubts and worries on the part of Mainland China that Taiwan will march toward independence. At the same, Taiwan, after acquiring full international legal personality, would be willing to establish a third subject shared by the two sides. A “third subject” represents a “Whole China” (Taiwan plus Mainland China). It indicates to a degree the transfer of sovereignty from both sides, which in turn makes “Whole China” not merely an “abstract” concept, but a “substantial” entity.　

In real practice, the two sides could, say, take turns in chairing the “Cross-Strait Community,” or negotiate to divide on the chair seats depending on their needs in different international organizations.  For instance, if the two sides are to jointly take part in the WHO and ILO, Taiwan may choose to lead in the Cross-Strait Community’s representative in the WHO, in view of its achievement and competence in the medical field. And Mainland China could take a leading role in the other organization. The “third subject” may have limited power in the beginning period. With the deepening of cross-Strait integration, however, the “third subject” would gain an increasing presence and take over a growing portion of power from the two other subjects, as is with the case of European integration.　

As for the question if there is a legal basis that would enable international organizations or other countries to accept the proposition of a “third subject” for solving the problem of China representative, the answer is positive. The principle of “one China” has been widely accepted among the international society. That Taiwan and Mainland China have independent sovereignty over their respective territory during the past 50-some years of split is also a reality acquiesced by the international society. Under such circumstances, the international society would have neither legal ground nor political reason to obstruct such a solution to cross-Strait conflicts that would be favorable to the whole global society too, if only the Taiwan and Mainland China are willing to cease their conflicts.　

The solution suggested by this article will help increase the recognition of “Whole China” both by the international society and across the Strait. It advocates a gradual process of integration that puts emphasis on mutual respect for each other’s subject position. It also promises a viable and creative way in both the producing and strengthening of a new subject, which is beneficial to the people of the whole China.　

The author has published six books:

• On Sovereignty between Mainland and China

• European Integration: Intergovernmentalism vs. Supranationalism

• German Question in International Law and Constitution

• America's China Policy: Containment, Engagement, Strategic Partnership

•  Mainland China and Relations across Taiwan Strait

• On Integration across Taiwan Strait